Re-shoring Tariffs, Globalization & the Limits of U.S. Industrial Policy

1. Globalization: the “Monster” the West Created

To tell the full story, we could start at Bretton Woods: the U.S.-led security umbrella, containment of the Soviet Union, spread of global bases, the gold-exchange standard, the cost of Vietnam, the dawn of dollarisation, bond-market creation, and the unprecedented post-war boom that peaked globally—at least for the non-rogue world—in 2019.
Add the first U.S.–China trade war, COVID-era supply-chain shocks, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, dollar-weaponisation backfires, Europe’s power-price spiral under sanctions, and today’s reciprocal “MAGA-tariff” economics, and you have a sweeping political journey from the fall of one empire to the rise of others.

For brevity, let’s fast-forward to 2000 and examine corporate-driven globalism—the relentless search for profit, a one-way journey not easily reversed by policy alone.

Since 2000 Western multinationals have chased ever-lower production costs by offshoring to emerging economies that sweeten the deal with:

• Cheaper labour (often magnified by deliberate currency depreciation).
• Light-touch corporate tax—typically 0–17 %, versus ≈30 % in the U.S. and ≈50 % in much of Europe.
• Tax holidays on reinvested profits.

The result is a web of supply chains where production occurs abroad while profits accumulate in low-tax jurisdictions, hollowing out mid- and low-value U.S. manufacturing.

2. Trump-Era Tariff Logic

The Trump strategy tries to offset revenue lost to individual tax cuts with extra tariff receipts and to nudge production back onshore. In practice, the U.S. faces two powerful counter-forces:

3. Domestic Constraints on “Made in America”

1. Industrial mix
   Industrial Production Index (base 2000 = 100, nominal dollars):
   • Overall: 103.8 (+0.15 % CAGR)
   • Durables: 124.3 (+0.91 % CAGR)
   • Non-durables: 93.2 (–0.27 % CAGR)

   The U.S. now specialises in high-value, high-margin goods (≈16–18 % profit after tax). Lower-margin segments left long ago.

2. Labour market
   • 69.6 % of the labour force holds some college or a bachelor’s degree+ (up from 58 % in 2000).
   • Unemployment hovers at 4 %. Skilled workers are expensive and scarce—ill-suited to low-value assembly.
3. Exchange-rate drift (Jan 2008 → Jun 2025)

4. What the U.S. Imports — and From Where

2015 → 2024 Census/BEA data

Fastest-growing import lines (CAGR):

1. Finished metal shapes 12.4 %
2. Nuclear fuel 10.3 %
3. Pharmaceuticals 9.6 %
4. Bakery goods 9.5 %
5. Electric apparatus 8.6 %

Highest-value categories (share of 2024 import bill):

5. Realistic Re-shoring Targets

6. AEI’s Profit-Repatriation Proposal

Treat foreign-made goods of U.S. firms as if produced at home.

1. Import at cost (e.g., iPhone lands at $100, not $120).
2. U.S. entity marks up to retail ($120) and pays U.S. tax on the $20 profit.
3. Production stays abroad, but the tax base shifts homeward.

Feasible—yet politically delicate and administratively complex. Implementation would be incremental and face WTO scrutiny.

7. Revenue Reality Check

Early White-House talk of $200–300 bn in extra tariff revenue is implausible. Even aggressive levies can:

• Modestly trim the trade gap (offset by higher consumer prices).
• Slightly lift corporate-tax collections via on-shored margin or AEI-style adjustments.

They cannot fully backfill the revenue lost to sweeping income-tax cuts.

8. Takeaways

• Tariffs can tilt specific industries but cannot reverse two decades of off-shoring economics.
• Durable gains hinge on industrial strategy—subsidies, skills, energy costs—more than on blunt tariff weapons.
• The AEI approach—taxing profits where the consumer resides—could claw back revenue without forcing impossible cost realities onto U.S. factories.
• Expect incremental wins (autos, selected generics) rather than a rapid, across-the-board manufacturing renaissance.

Bottom line: Tariffs alone are a scalpel, not a sledgehammer. They can score tactical victories, but restoring broad-based industrial capacity demands a wider policy toolkit—tax reform, workforce development, and strategic sector incentives—balanced against global supply-chain realities.

The American system has always self-regulated; the real lever is monetary. Operate through the Federal Reserve to curb some of the dollar’s overvaluation and claw back part of other currencies’ devaluation—a tall order, but crucial, given that U.S. capital markets remain the world’s most attractive for both stocks and bonds. Still, higher rates are required to keep bond auctions clearing—a vicious circle.

Regulating trade by country misses the mark. Policy should target specific sectors within countries, coupled with incentives to re-shore a manageable slice of imports—cars and pharma are viable; others are not. At best, tariff parity may nudge exports higher. Multinational lobbies will still wield outsized influence; professionals are needed at the helm.

America has massive expertise and brain power waiting to provide solutions, and this is largely ignored or censored out by the media or agencies or is not part of the political agenda and team, but the solutions are there, if the eminent sources of intelligence are tapped-  in time, they maybe and the market waits for clarity.

For us as traders, understanding the global context of the system and market,  the systemic levers—why markets oscillate between risk-on and risk-off—is vital, regardless of the daily spectacle in Washington, left or right- it’s irrelevant; Rates the current hurdle, sticky inflation, and chaotic policy makers – certainty and uncertainty are the 2 drivers of the market phase.